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Despite substantial differences in monetary policy and communication strategies, 
many central banks share the practice of purdah, a self-imposed guideline of 
abstaining from communication around policy meetings or other important events. 
This practice is remarkable, as it seems to contradict the virtue of transparency by 
requiring central banks to withhold information precisely when it is sought after 
intensely. However, imposing such a limit to communication has often been justified 
on grounds that such communication may create excessive market volatility and 
unnecessary speculation. This short paper assesses the purdah for the Federal 
Reserve. The empirical results confirm the conjecture that financial markets are 
substantially more sensitive to central bank communication around policy meetings. 
Short-term interest rates react three to four times more strongly to statements in the 
purdah before FOMC meetings than during other times, and market volatility 
increases (compared to a volatility reduction induced by statements otherwise). The 
findings thus offer relevant insights about the limits to central bank transparency. 
 
JEL classification:   E58, E52, E43. 
 
Keywords: purdah; communication; transparency; monetary policy; interest rates; 
effectiveness; Federal Reserve. 5
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Central banks around the globe are pursuing not only different policy objectives, but they also 
have in place vastly different strategies of conveying policy and communicating with the 
public. Despite these differences, however, there is one element that most central banks share, 
at least among advanced economies. This element is the purdah, the practice of a self-
imposed, voluntary guideline to abstain from communicating in the period around monetary 
policy decisions and other important events. The existence of such a practice is remarkable in 
several ways. At first sight, it seems to contradict the virtue of transparency which has 
become the hallmark of virtually all progressive central banks today, as it requires 
withholding information from the public when such information is sought after intensely and 
would likely affect financial markets substantially.  
 
Why then do central banks pursue such a policy? Remarkably little official information about 
this practice is provided by central banks, partly reflecting the fact that the purdah is mostly 
not an official rule but a voluntary guideline, created by the members of the policy-setting 
committees themselves. The information that is available on this practice indicates that an 
important rationale for the purdah is the fear that communication just before policy meetings 
or other important events may create excessive market volatility and unnecessary speculation.  
 
The paper assesses this issue for the Federal Reserve, for which a purdah has been in place at 
least since the early 1980s, nowadays for the 7 days before and 3 days after Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, as well as before the Chairman’s semi-annual 
testimony to Congress. For our empirical analysis, we exploit the fact that statements do 
occasionally reach financial markets during the blackout period. Examples for such instances 
comprise delayed reporting of statements that were made after market closure on the last day 
prior to the purdah, pre-scheduled obligatory speaking engagements during the purdah such as 
testimonies (only observed in the earlier parts of our sample), unintentional or at times 
possibly intentional statements. This paper does not look into the underlying motivations for 
such statements, as we are only interested in understanding their impact on financial markets. 
 
We study the impact of communication on the level as well as the conditional volatility of 
interest rates along the US yield curve. We find that short-term interest rates react three to 
four times more strongly to statements reported in the pre-FOMC purdah (immediately before 
FOMC meetings) than during other times. Furthermore, statements reported in the pre-FOMC 
purdah tend to raise market volatility while those in the post-FOMC purdah (in the days 
following FOMC meetings) or outside the purdah tend to lower volatility. Therefore 
communication appears to have fundamentally different implications for market uncertainty 
depending on its timing.  
 
The empirical findings have several implications. Taking a broader perspective, the results 
underline that the timing of communication matters for its impact on financial markets. The 
excessive sensitivity of financial market participants to communication in the purdah prior to 
FOMC meetings suggests that central banks might indeed be well advised to observe this rule. 
By contrast, post-FOMC purdah statements mostly reduce the conditional variance of interest 
rate movements, thus suggesting that they are at least partly successful in lowering 
uncertainty and settling markets. Communication immediately after policy surprises in 
particular may be an effective policy tool. 
 
As the purdah concerns only a relatively short period of time, the findings of this paper are 
not applicable to guide central banks’ communication policies outside this restricted time 
window. Nonetheless, the analysis of this special event provides relevant lessons about the 
limits to central bank transparency. 6
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1.  Introduction 
 
Central banks around the globe are pursuing not only different policy objectives, but they also 
have in place vastly different strategies of conveying policy and communicating with the 
public. Despite these differences, however, there is one element that most central banks share, 
at least among advanced economies. This element is the purdah, the practice of a self-
imposed, voluntary guideline to abstain from communicating in the period around monetary 
policy decisions and other important events. The existence of such a practice is remarkable in 
several ways. At first sight, it seems to contradict the virtue of transparency which has 
become the hallmark of virtually all progressive central banks today, as it requires 
withholding information from the public when such information is sought after intensely and 
would likely affect financial markets substantially.  
 
Why then do central banks pursue such a policy? Remarkably little official information about 
this practice is provided by central banks, partly reflecting the fact that the purdah is mostly 
not an official rule but a voluntary guideline, created by the members of the policy-setting 
committees themselves. The information that is available on this practice indicates that an 
important rationale for the purdah is the fear that communication just before policy meetings 
or other important events may create excessive market volatility and “unnecessary 
speculation” (Federal Reserve 1982, 1995; Bank of England 2000). This presumably may not 
only be detrimental from a financial market perspective, but it may also narrow the options 
for committees in their policy decisions. Similarly, statements by individual committee 
members just after a policy decision may be feared to “dilute” the message of the decision 
(Federal Reserve 1995). 
 
These arguments underline that at times and under certain circumstances central banks 
consider communication to be undesirable – even if, or precisely because they have superior 
information – thus stressing the limits to central bank transparency. The paper assesses this 
practice for the Federal Reserve, for which a purdah has been in place at least since the early 
1980s, nowadays for the 7 days before and 3 days after Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) meetings, as well as before the Chairman’s semi-annual testimony to Congress
1 For 
our empirical analysis, we exploit the fact that statements do occasionally reach financial 
markets during the blackout period. Examples for such instances comprise delayed reporting 
of statements that were made after market closure on the last day prior to the purdah, pre-
scheduled obligatory speaking engagements during the purdah such as testimonies (only 
observed in the earlier parts of our sample), unintentional or at times possibly intentional 
statements. This paper does not look into the underlying motivations for such statements, as 
we are only interested in understanding their impact on financial markets. 
 
We study the impact of communication on the level as well as the conditional volatility of 
interest rates along the US yield curve. We find that short-term interest rates react three to 
four times more strongly to statements reported in the pre-FOMC purdah (immediately before 
FOMC meetings) than during other times. A further revealing finding is that statements by 
FOMC members reported in the pre-FOMC purdah tend to raise market volatility while those 
in the post-FOMC purdah (in the days following FOMC meetings) or outside the purdah tend 
to lower volatility. Therefore communication appears to have fundamentally different 
implications for market uncertainty depending on its timing.  
 
Moreover, communication that is reported during the blackout period (which we will call 
“purdah communication” or “purdah statements” for simplicity) moves interest rates 
differently from other communication primarily at the short end of the maturity spectrum. 
                                                 
1 We use the Federal Reserve as a case study, rather than a panel of central banks, because the Federal 
Reserve is one of the few central banks that acknowledges the presence of such a practice, and because 
it provides us with a sufficiently long time period for the empirical analysis. 7
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This is indicative that market participants focus more strongly on the current monetary policy 
stance than on the longer-term outlook for policy in such instances. Finally, the market impact 
of purdah communication is directly linked to the monetary policy environment in which it 
occurs. In particular, purdah statements immediately following an FOMC decision that came 
as a surprise for financial markets have a substantially larger effect on the level of US interest 
rates and reduce market volatility much more strongly. 
 
The empirical findings have several implications. Taking a broader perspective, the results 
underline that the timing of communication – not just relative to policy meetings, but more 
generally dependent on the market conditions – is of crucial importance when shaping 
communication policies. The excessive sensitivity of financial market participants to 
communication in the purdah prior to FOMC meetings suggests that central banks might 
indeed be well advised to observe this rule. These statements seem detrimental as they move 
markets excessively, and at the same time raise market volatility substantially, thus providing 
support for central banks’ claims that such communication creates excessive volatility. By 
contrast, post-FOMC purdah statements mostly reduce the conditional variance of interest 
rate movements, thus suggesting that they are at least partly successful in lowering 
uncertainty and settling markets. Communication immediately after policy surprises in 
particular may be an effective policy tool. 
 
Beyond these implications for policy makers, the paper adds to the recent literature on 
monetary policy, transparency and communication. One important strand of this literature has 
focused on the issue of incomplete, asymmetric or noisy information. In the work by Morris 
and Shin (2002) and Amato, Morris and Shin (2002), transparency may be detrimental to 
welfare because of the noisiness of the information coupled with central banks’ focal role as 
market coordinator; although Svensson (2006) challenges that central bank information may 
not be sufficiently noisier than private information. In a similar vein, Faust and Leeper 
(2005), Cukierman (2006), Rudebusch and Williams (2006) and Gosselin, Lotz and Wyplosz 
(2007) show the potentially welfare-reducing effects of central bank transparency in an 
environment of information asymmetries or heterogeneity. Moreover, an important part of the 
literature has focused on the overall quality of information available to central banks (Romer 
and Romer 2000, Orphanides 2003). 
 
A different strand of the literature stresses the role of the market environment for transparency 
to be effective and desirable. Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004), Eggertsson and Woodford 
(2003) and Woodford (2005) emphasize that Fed communication was crucial when there was 
a deflationary risk for the US economy. Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) and Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher (2007a) analyze the announcement of FOMC decisions, in particular the 
effectiveness of the balance-of-risks assessments since May 1999, and show that the bias has 
indeed been an effective guide of market expectations about the path of monetary policy.  
 
A final area is the rapidly growing empirical literature on understanding how central bank 
transparency and communication affect financial markets. Overall, there has been compelling 
evidence that communication exerts a substantial impact (Guthrie and Wright 2000, Kohn and 
Sack 2004, Reinhart and Sack 2006, Ehrmann and Fratzscher 2007b), though an open 
question remains to what extent central banks really intend to move financial markets. 
 
The present paper broadly fits into these three areas, but it is also distinct in several ways. In 
particular, the argument presented here in an empirical setting is that there may be important 
instances when central bank information is vastly superior, but still communication may be 
welfare-reducing and thus such information is withheld, or at least channeled in a specific 
manner. Moreover, the paper stresses the importance of the market environment and the 
endogeneity of the effects of communication. As the purdah concerns only a relatively short 
period of time, the findings of this paper are not applicable to guide central banks’ 8
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communication policies outside this restricted time window. Nonetheless, the analysis of this 
special event provides relevant lessons about the limits to central bank transparency. 
 
The paper proceeds by discussing the institutional design of the purdah at the Federal Reserve 
in section 2, before section 3 outlines the measurement of communication by FOMC 
members. Section 4 analyses how purdah communication has affected financial markets. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Institutional Design of the Purdah Period 
 
The word ‘purdah’ originally comes from Urdu and Hindi, and literally means ‘curtain’. It 
refers to the practice of preventing men from seeing women, which is followed in some 
Islamic countries and among some groups of society in India. It traditionally has taken two 
forms, one the practice of women concealing their bodies and faces, and another the physical 
segregation of men and women (see e.g. Wikipedia 2008). In the Western world, the term 
seems to have first been used in the UK, with reference to the practice of withholding relevant 
information about the UK budget or just before general elections. 
 
The term has also increasingly been used informally with reference to central banks. 
However, there is remarkably little official information about the practice of the purdah 
among central banks. One reason for this lack of official recognition may be the fact that the 
practice constitutes a voluntary, self-imposed guideline, rather than an explicit rule. However, 
a notable exception is the Bank of England, which provides an official statement about 
“speaking restrictions” (Bank of England, 2000): 
 
“Monetary Policy Framework Speaking Restrictions: 
 
To help prevent unnecessary speculation about MPC interest-rate decisions, 
members of the Monetary Policy Committee have a 'purdah' guideline. This 
requires that for a limited time each month they avoid giving speeches and 
speaking to the news media or other interests, on or off the record, about monetary 
and fiscal policy and the conjuncture, or anything else which could be considered 
relevant to their interest rate decisions or the forecast. 
• The limit is for a period of eight days from the Friday before the MPC meeting to 
the Friday immediately after the announcement.  
• The period is inclusive of both Fridays, running from midnight to midnight.  
• In addition, in the four months when the Inflation Report publication and press 
conference take place (February, May, August and November) the purdah extends 
to midnight at the end of the day of publication.  
• The guideline also precludes publication during purdah of any interview given 
beforehand.  
• Other senior executives within the Bank also generally adhere to the guideline.” 
 
Although no such official statements are available for most central banks, including the 
Federal Reserve, transcripts of various FOMC meetings over the past few decades provide 
some information about the purdah practice, its rationale and objectives for the FOMC. 
 
The study of FOMC transcripts shows that the purdah practice for the Federal Reserve goes 
back at least to the early 1980s, to a time when FOMC members talked relatively freely to the 
media immediately before and after FOMC decisions. The transcripts indicate that some 
journalists went so far as to do a “round-robin” of calling all 19 FOMC members before a 
meeting, thereby obtaining a fairly accurate understanding of the likely debate in the FOMC 
and its outcome (Federal Reserve 1982, 1995, see Appendix A1 and A2) 9
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An important FOMC meeting that clarified a number of details, and also introduced some 
changes, to the purdah or blackout period was the FOMC meeting of January 31-February 1, 
1995. In 1994, Chairman Greenspan had appointed a four-member sub-committee on FOMC 
disclosure policy, chaired by then-Governor Alan Blinder, which had been asked to review 
FOMC disclosure practices and possibly suggest changes. The sub-committee tackled four 
main issues, including first, the practices surrounding the announcements made by the FOMC 
after each meeting since February 1994; second, tapes and transcripts made of FOMC 
meetings and their release; third, the release of minutes of FOMC meetings; and the issue of 
the blackout period of communication by FOMC members. 
 
Several issues require clarification regarding the purdah period. A first issue is what type of 
information the purdah period excludes from being discussed publicly. It obviously concerns 
monetary policy issues, but even in the FOMC discussion on this question in 1995 it was not 
clear to all FOMC members whether this includes also information about the economic 
outlook and the forecast. During this meeting, it was confirmed that it includes all types of 
information that are relevant for monetary policy decisions, including the overall condition of 
the economy (Federal Reserve 1995, see Appendix A4). 
 
As a second issue – the length of the purdah period – it lasts from seven days before an 
FOMC meeting, which usually take place on Tuesdays, till the end of the week of the 
meeting. In fact, the FOMC at its January 31-February 1, 1995, meeting decided to shorten 
the blackout period after FOMC meetings from 7 days to about three days, as it was felt that 
the purdah period was relatively long under the previous practice, covering one third of the 
usual six-week length of a typical inter-meeting period. In addition, a third element of the 
blackout guideline is the period between FOMC meetings and the Humphrey-Hawkins 
testimonies, since 2000 called Semiannual Monetary Policy Report of the FOMC Chairman to 
Congress. These testimonies take place twice a year, usually in February and in July, and the 
purdah guideline indicates that there should be no communication by FOMC members 
between the previous FOMC meeting and the testimony during those two months. 
 
A third point concerns the motivation for the purdah guideline. The rationale is obviously 
somewhat different depending on whether the guideline concerns the time before or after 
FOMC meetings, or before the monetary policy testimonies. From the transcripts of past 
FOMC meetings it appears that one concern is that communication immediately before 
monetary policy decisions may create excessive market speculation and market volatility, 
which moreover may narrow the options of the committee. This is also expressed in the Bank 
of England statement above, which talks about “unnecessary speculation”. By contrast, a 
major concern for communication immediately after FOMC meetings is that “the thrust of the 
announced decision of the Committee then gets diluted” by these statements, as expressed by 
Mr. Greenspan (Federal Reserve 1995, see Appendix A5). Moreover, the rationale for not 
communicating before the monetary policy testimonies is not to “preempt” or possibly even 
contradict the information the Chairman is going to give to Congress (see Appendix A6). 
 
As transcripts are released only with a five-year delay and given the unofficial character of 
the guideline, it is hard to say whether there have been any changes in the Federal Reserve’s 
purdah guideline since 2002. However, from the actual practice and the few comments by 
FOMC members on this issue, it appears that the blackout guideline continues to be in place. 
As a final note, it is interesting that in the transcript of the January 31-February 1, 1995, 
meeting, it was acknowledged that the purdah “has not worked 100 percent” (Federal Reserve 
1995, p. 35). The objective of the remainder of the paper is therefore to investigate the effects 
of purdah communication on financial markets to assess whether there is empirical support 
for the argument that purdah communication might create excessive volatility. 
 10
ECB
Working Paper Series No 868
February 2008
3.  Measuring Communication 
 
As to the data on communication, our objective is to extract all relevant public statements by 
the FOMC as a whole as well as by its individual members in the entire inter-meeting period, 
i.e. both within and outside the purdah. The database was originally developed in Ehrmann 
and Fratzscher (2007b), and was extended through June 2007 for the present paper. The 
methodology behind the database is explained in detail in Appendix B, while we give only a 
summary outline in this section. We intentionally take a financial market perspective and 
attempt to measure all information financial market participants receive about statements by 
the FOMC members. We therefore chose ReutersNews, one of the dominant newswire 
services, as a data source from which to extract all statements about the monetary policy 
inclination or the economic outlook by the FOMC members. Only statements by the 
committee as a whole, such as on FOMC meeting days or the release of the Minutes, and 
statements by FOMC members on such days are excluded from the analysis. 
 
As a next issue, we classify each statement into whether it implies an inclination towards an 
easing, a tightening or no bias concerning monetary policy (assigning the values -1, 1 and 0, 
respectively; for instance, a concern about higher inflation would constitute an inclination 
towards tightening, a statement about a weakening economic outlook an inclination towards 
easing). Such a classification is valuable because it allows us to test whether statements exert 
a significant effect on the mean of asset prices, rather than only on the volatility. A key 
difficulty is clearly how to ensure that the classification is done correctly and reflects market 
participants’ understanding of the message. As outlined in more detail in Appendix B, we use 
content analysis to achieve this classification, which implies having different individuals 
classify the statements independently and discarding those that are not unanimous. 
Nevertheless, the classification of the great majority of statements was unanimous. 
 
We chose to begin our analysis in February 1994 when the FOMC started announcing its 
decisions immediately following each FOMC meeting. In total, our database includes 
statements surrounding 106 scheduled FOMC meetings, while unscheduled FOMC meetings 
are excluded since these are difficult to compare to regular meetings. Our database covers 477 
statements in total. With around 90%, the vast majority of statements is recorded outside the 
purdah. These aggregate numbers conceal interesting time variations, however. First, there is 
a clear increase in the number of statements. Over the period from 1994-2000, which covers 
55 FOMC meetings, we have recorded a total of 180 statements, whereas in 2001-2007 (51 
FOMC meetings), our database contains 297 statements. At the same time, there has been a 
remarkable reduction in purdah statements, with 31 pre-FOMC purdah statements (i.e. those 
reported in the seven days prior to scheduled FOMC meetings) in the first, and 15 in the 
second subsample (see Table 1). For the years from 2005-2007, only 1.4% of all statements 




Table 1 lists furthermore the percentage share of inter-meeting periods when there were 
statements by FOMC members in the purdah period. The declining incidence of purdah 
communication is apparent also here. In total, there have been purdah statements in 42% of 
the 106 FOMC meetings since 1994, and more precisely, in about one out of three pre-FOMC 
purdah periods and one in seven post-FOMC purdah periods. The share of FOMC meetings 
with purdah statements drops to only 15%, or three statements in total, in the period 2005-
2007.  
 
These numbers seem quite substantial. However, it should again be emphasized that the fact 
of a statement having been published during a purdah period does not necessarily constitute a 
violation of the purdah guideline by FOMC members. There are a number of reasons why a 11
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statement can be published during a blackout period. In our database, there are a number of 
instances where a statement was made on the evening of the last day prior to the purdah, for 
instance on the occasion of a dinner speech. As markets had closed by the time of the event, 
these statements often get reported upon on the next morning, i.e. within the purdah. At the 
beginning of our sample period, we also observe purdah statements made on the occasion of 
pre-scheduled, obligatory speaking engagements such as testimonies. Of course, there might 
also be misreporting or misunderstandings, such that a statement that was not intended to fall 
under the purdah guidelines is reported on in a way that makes it look like a purdah statement. 
As misunderstandings might also occur during our own classification, Appendix C provides 
the relevant statements contained in our database, allowing the interested reader to cross-
check our classification. Finally, statements might also be due to intentional efforts to convey 
important information to markets. In this paper, we do not take a stand on the underlying 
reasons; we take the observed statements as our starting point, with the objective of analyzing 
their effect on financial markets. This is what we turn to next. 
 
 
4.  Purdah communication and financial market reactions 
 
We now turn to analyzing the effects of communication on financial markets and the question 
whether statements reported in the blackout period are special in this regard. We study the 
effect of communication on the level as well as the volatility of asset prices, in particular 
interest rates along the yield curve. For that purpose, we estimate an exponential GARCH 
(EGARCH) model, following Nelson (1991), to test for the effect of statements on both the 
conditional mean as well as on the conditional variance of asset prices at a daily frequency. 
An EGARCH(1,1) model is sufficient to address the non-normality of the data, in particular 
the serial correlation and heteroskedasticity of the daily interest rate series. The conditional 







t z r COM r ε δ γ β α + + + + = − ¦ 1           (1) 
 
with rt as the change in the daily US interest rate series, rt-1 as the lagged change, zt as a vector 
of controls comprising day-of-the-week effects, and COM
k
t as the communication variables. 
As explained in section 3, COM
k
t takes the value of -1 for statements suggesting an easing 
inclination, +1 for statements suggesting a tightening, and 0 otherwise.
2 k denotes statements 
reported in the three different parts of an inter-meeting period, i.e. 
} , , { purdah FOMC pre purdah no purdah FOMC post k − − ∈ . Note that the model is 
estimated for all business days in the sample, i.e. also for days where no communication 




















































1 log 2 log
        (2) 
                                                 
2 Differently to the standard practice in the announcement literature, we do not control for market 
expectations, for mainly two reasons. First, identifying market expectations about the content of a 
speech or an interview is practically impossible. Second, even though some of the speaking 
engagements might be pre-announced, their content is in most cases not. The mere fact that a speaker 
touches upon an issue (even though possibly confirming the market’s views about the future path of 
policy) can therefore be sufficient to generate relevant news to the market. Otherwise, we would expect 
our variable to be measured with error, leading to an attenuated estimator in the mean equation.  12
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such that the conditional variance of US interest rate changes (ht) is a function of the past 
variance (ht-1) and past innovations (İt-1), as well as a communication dummy CD
k
t that takes 
the value 1 on all days a communication event is observed, and 0 otherwise, and the day-of-
the-week effects zt. The model is estimated via maximum likelihood, using a Simplex 
algorithm to obtain initial values and the BHHH and BFGS algorithms for optimization. 
 
Our interest lies in particular with two parameters, namely β and λ. A first hypothesis 
suggests that H0: β
k>0, i.e. that communication has an effect on the level of US interest rates, 
and in the expected direction (whereby “easing statements” lower interest rates, and 
“tightening statements” raise them). This should hold for all parts of the inter-meeting period 
alike. In contrast, the hypothesis of elevated market sensitivity would suggest that β 
purdah>β
 no-
purdah. Unfortunately, such a pattern could arise due to two reasons, however. First, it would 
result if purdah communication indeed would lead to stronger market reactions. Second, and 
observationally equivalent, it would emerge if the information contained in the 
communication during the purdah carried a different information content. These two factors 
are very difficult to distinguish, and we can only provide indirect evidence in that regard. 
 
Finally, we do not have a prior on whether communication would increase or reduce 
volatility; however, the hypothesis that purdah communication carries the risk of triggering 
excess volatility would imply that λ 
purdah>λ
 no-purdah.
3 Unlike in the case of the mean equation, 
we are not aware of an alternative explanation that could generate this relationship, such that 
this test is able to provide clear-cut evidence about the excess volatility hypothesis.  
 
Table 2 shows the point estimates for the effect of Fed communication on US 6-month 
interest rates,
4 separating whether statements occurred in one of the two parts of the purdah or 
whether they took place in the inter-meeting period outside the blackout period. The right-
hand columns indicate whether the coefficient estimates are statistically significantly different 
from one another.  
 
Overall, statements by FOMC members appear to have a highly significant and sizeable effect 
on short-term interest rates. With all three estimates for β
k being positive, there is clear 
evidence that communication affects interest rates in the expected directions. Statements 
outside the purdah period move the level of interest rates on average by about 0.6 basis points 
(b.p.). By contrast, statements in the pre-FOMC purdah period affect interest rates on average 
by 4.3 b.p.. Hence, the hypothesis that β 
pre-FOMC purdah>β
 no-purdah is easily accepted for the pre-
FOMC purdah communication. At the same time, we do not find that β 
post-FOMC purdah>β
 no-
purdah, as statements in the post-FOMC purdah have no statistically significant effect on the 




Of course, statements during the purdah period are much less frequent than those outside of it 
– Table 1 showed that there were only 62 statements during the purdah in 1994-2007 – so that 
this finding should not be interpreted as implying that communication in the purdah period 
moves interest rates by more overall. Nevertheless, what the findings underline is that a single 
statement has a substantially larger impact on financial markets if it is made during the purdah 
period just prior to FOMC meetings. This supports the argument by central bankers that 
                                                 
3 Note that the volatility in this model is a conditional one, implying that λ measures the effect of 
statements on that part of the variance which cannot be accounted for by the effect of communication 
and other controls on the level of interest rates. Hence, for instance, it can be consistent to find that β>0 
and  λ<0, i.e. that a particular type of statements moves the level but also lowers the conditional 
variance of interest rates. 
4 All interest rate data are constant maturity treasury rates provided by the U.S. Treasury.  13
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markets are generally much more sensitive to statements made shortly before FOMC 
meetings – although we still need to check whether the competing hypothesis of a 
fundamentally different information content of the two types of communication gets 
supported by the data. We will return to this later on.  
 
An interesting difference is present for the conditional variance of US interest rates. 
Communication in the pre-FOMC purdah tends to raise market volatility, while statements in 
the post-FOMC purdah period and outside the purdah lower it significantly. This suggests that 
the timing of statements is important. In particular, communication just before FOMC 
meetings raises volatility, whereas statements immediately following FOMC decisions tend to 




We next extend the analysis to the full maturity spectrum of US interest rates. Figure 1 shows 
the point estimates and 90% confidence intervals for the impact of pre-FOMC purdah, post-
FOMC purdah, and no-purdah statements on the level of interest rates ranging from 1 month 
to 20 years. Figure 2 provides the same information for the conditional variance. The main 
finding of the figures is that the differences across types of statements are largest at the short 
end of the maturity spectrum, which become somewhat smaller and in some cases statistically 
insignificant beyond 1-year maturities. For instance, the coefficients for pre-FOMC purdah 
and no-purdah statements on the level of US interest rates are significantly different up to 1 
year, but converge and become equal at the long end of the yield curve. Even more striking is 
the convergence process for the conditional variances shown in Figure 2 as differences to pre-





How robust are these results? We conduct a battery of robustness tests and extensions to 
check whether and how these benchmark findings may change. In particular, given the limited 
sample size for purdah statements, we need to ensure that the point estimates are not driven 
by a few outliers. Figure 3 shows the histogram for the distribution of interest rate responses 
on communication days during the purdah (Figure 3.A) and on communication days outside 
the purdah (Figure 3.B), for 6-month interest rates. Most importantly, there are no outliers that 
appear to drive the results. Second, we more directly control for other factors that may drive 
interest rates on communication days by including in the vector of controls zt a set of 12 
important US macroeconomic announcement shocks.
5 The results of Table 2 and Figures 1 
and 2 are basically unchanged when such news shocks are included, suggesting that at least 
such news do not systematically affect the findings for FOMC communication. Third, we test 
for parameter stability over time. Keeping in mind the limitations imposed by the small 
sample, we split the sample in May 1999 when the FOMC changed its communication 
strategy by providing a bias statement with its decisions, which in turn could mean that 
purdah communication (at least in the post-meeting purdah) may have become less relevant. 
However, the point estimates of Table 2 are not statistically significantly different when 
taking this sample split, confirming the robustness of the findings also from this perspective. 
 
Returning to the analysis, what the findings indicate so far is that market reactions to 
communication in the different parts of the inter-meeting period are fundamentally different. 
                                                 
5 These include the most standard variables used in the announcement literature, i.e. indicators of real 
activity (GDP, industrial production, unemployment, non-farm payroll employment, hours worked, 
retail sales), confidence indicators (ISM, consumer confidence, housing starts), prices (CPI and PPI) 
and the US trade balance. Monetary policy surprises are excluded as no statements on FOMC meeting 
days are included in the analysis. 14
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On the one hand, the evidence about increasing volatility in the pre-FOMC purdah clearly 
supports the notion of purdah-communication creating excessive volatility. On the other hand, 
the fact that communication in the pre-FOMC purdah raises interest rate levels by more than 
otherwise, as well as that the differences in the effects on the level of interest rates are largest 
for the short end of the maturity spectrum could be due to two reasons. Either markets attach 
stronger weights to this information, and try to distill in particular information on the current 
monetary policy stance rather than on the longer-term outlook for policy, or purdah 
statements contain fundamentally different information, e.g. about upcoming decisions which 




A first reason why it is most likely not the information content that differs lies in our 
construction of the dataset. By searching exclusively for statements that bear the name of an 
FOMC member, we neglect statements by “senior Fed officials”, which are often assumed to 
be a means to get important information to markets without having to go through the standard 
communication channels. For these types of statements information content might well be 
different.
6 Second, in order to further get at this issue, and to see how robust the results are, 
we extend our analysis by distinguishing between different conditions under which statements 
are made. Due to the small number of observations of purdah communication, a further split 
is bound to lead to small samples, likely affecting the significance of our results. Table 3 
shows the impact of statements conditional on the characteristics of the surrounding FOMC 
decisions. A number of striking findings stand out. First, the effects of pre-FOMC purdah 
statements on the level of interest rates do not depend on whether or not policy rates will be 
changing at the upcoming meeting. We take this as suggestive evidence that the information 
contained in the pre-FOMC purdah statements is not fundamentally different from other 
communication; if it were, we would expect to see larger effects on interest rates if an interest 
rate change was in the offing. We stress that this interpretation of the finding is merely 
suggestive as it assumes that interest rate changes are less anticipated than decisions where 
rates are kept unchanged. While this is in general the case for the full sample period, it 
obviously may not hold for each individual meeting. 
 
Second, statements in the post-FOMC purdah period have a substantially larger effect when 
the last decision entailed a surprise for market participants. This holds both for the conditional 
mean and the conditional volatility of interest rates, and is suggestive that there is scope for 
FOMC members to clarify a given decision beyond the FOMC statement accompanying its 
announcement. 
 
Finally, the impact of statements on the level of interest rates is mostly larger when market 
uncertainty (as measured through the degree of interest rate volatility in the inter-meting 
period) is high. This is suggestive that communication appears to add more information when 
such uncertainty is high. By contrast, statements in many cases raise the conditional variance 
of interest rates. The exception is again the post-FOMC purdah communication, which helps 
to lower the conditional interest rate variance. 
 
In summary, communication by FOMC members appears to be a highly effective tool to 
guide financial markets. The empirical results of this section indicate that statements reported 
in the purdah period of the FOMC generally have a much larger impact on financial markets 
than statements made in the inter-meeting period outside the blackout period. This confirms 
that markets at the time around FOMC decisions are more sensitive to new information from 
the FOMC; this finding applies generally to pre-FOMC purdah communication, and also to 
post-FOMC purdah communication when the preceding decisions came as a surprise.  
 
                                                 
6 We would like to thank Alan Blinder for pointing this out to us. 15
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The purdah is a widespread practice among modern central banks, but to our knowledge no 
work has so far been undertaken to understand the rationale for this practice and to verify it 
empirically. The objective of the paper has been to fill this gap, in particular as transparency 
and communication have become important elements of many central banks’ work, and the 
purdah a relevant element of communication strategies. More importantly, the study of the 
special nature of the purdah offers a unique perspective on central bank communication and 
the limits to transparency. 
 
The paper has shown that purdah statements before FOMC meetings have a large effect on 
US interest rates, about three to four times larger than those in the inter-meeting period 
outside the purdah, and tend to increase market volatility significantly. Both findings provide 
support for the argument by several central bank committees that markets tend to be more 
sensitive around policy decisions, and that statements in such a period may induce excessive 
market volatility. While the case for having a purdah arrangement prior to committee 
meetings therefore finds strong support, we also find that statements immediately after FOMC 
meetings lead to a sizable reduction in market volatility, in particular if the preceding decision 
was largely unexpected. This suggests that there is scope for FOMC members to clarify a 
given decision beyond the initial FOMC statement announcing it.  
 
We are aware that the purdah concerns only a relatively short period of time, and that the 
findings here are not applicable to guide central banks’ communication policies outside this 
restricted time window. Nonetheless, the analysis of this special event suggests that there can 
be cases where an appropriate reception of the information content of central bank 
communication is not ensured. This special case study therefore yields important insights into 
the limits to central bank transparency. 16
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Appendix A: Quotes from FOMC transcripts 
 
 
A1:  Federal Reserve 1995 (p. 35) 
 
“MR. COYNE. This goes back, I would say, 15 years when there was a lot of discussion in 
the press stemming from comments made by various members of the Committee both before 
and after an FOMC meeting. Some of the papers liked to do a summary story immediately 
before the meeting. They would do a round-robin, calling all 19 people. They would compare 
answers and try to figure out what was going to happen. We were asked to put together some 
informal guidelines. These are not "rules" of the Committee. They are simply guidelines that I 
have propagated to the Committee. The purpose was to help the Committee deal with the 
press in sensitive periods. One of the things we came up with, that the then-Chairman agreed 
with, was this blackout period. People were not to talk to the press a week before and a week 
after a Committee meeting. … ” 
 
 
A2:  Federal Reserve 1982 (p. 54) 
 
“CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. … Joe Coyne might just talk a minute about his understanding of 
the rules and then we'll have a more general discussion of this or of any ideas anybody else 
might have. 
 
MR. COYNE. To be brief, my understanding is that the policy record, of course, comes out 
the Friday after the following meeting, and what that means is that we do not talk about what 
happened at that [earlier] meeting until that time. There are very, very, few exceptions to that. 
We can say we had a meeting: we can give the starting time and the closing time, and the 




A3:  Federal Reserve 1995 (p. 35) 
 
“MR. COYNE. … The purpose was to try to prevent all the speculation in the press and 
subsequently in the market about what the Committee would do. Now, we still get that 
speculation, but we get it from commentators. We do not get it from members of the 
Committee anymore. It has worked to an extent. It has not worked 100 percent. But a lot of 




A4:  Federal Reserve 1995 (pp. 35-36) 
 
“MR. COYNE. Someone asked whether it just covered monetary policy. It was supposed to 
cover monetary policy and the economy -- things that the Committee discusses when it is 
formulating monetary policy. 
 
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. My impression is that if a reasonably good reporter gets one of 
us to sit and discuss what is going on in the economy, it is a farce for us to say, "I won't 
discuss monetary policy but let me tell you what is going on in the economy." It is a farce 
because, while it may be that in the old days reporters were not very knowledgeable, many of 
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A5:  Federal Reserve 1995 (p. 35) 
 
“MR. COYNE. … If you are going to make the blackout period asymmetrical, I would say 
make it asymmetrical to the Friday following the meeting rather than for just two days. If it is 
only two days, then everybody will jump on it after 48 hours, and we are still going to get a 
lot of different comments. One of the problems is, if someone comments one way, as Mr. 
Forrestal just said, somebody else is going to try to jump the other way. Then we are going to 
get more and more people commenting.  
 
CHAIRMAN GREENSPAN. So, in a sense, the thrust of the announced decision of the 
Committee then gets diluted in the same way that consenting statements would do that.” 
 
 
A6:  Federal Reserve 1995 (p. 38) 
 
“VICE CHAIRMAN MCDONOUGH. … That can be between the meeting and the 
Humphrey-Hawkins testimony because we do not want to preempt what the Chairman is 
likely to say.” 
 
 
A7:  Federal Reserve 1982 (pp. 53-54) 
 
“CHAIRMAN VOLCKER. … I might also say that we had a leak—and may be more than 
one –about the Greenbook, as you know. … I am convinced that in a way it enormously 
complicates the policy problem because so much of policy is what people think it is or think 
our attitude is over a period of time as opposed to what we do. This whole situation is 
intolerable to me. This organization, above all others in Washington -- … -- does not leak. 
And I think it has been to our advantage to have that be both the impression and the reality. It 
has enormously increased our credibility, the credibility of official statements over the years, 
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Appendix B: Measuring central bank communication  
 
For the measurement of communication, our analysis is based on the data developed and 
described in more detail in Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007b). The objective is to obtain all 
communication events by FOMC members that contain statements which are relevant to infer 
information about their monetary policy inclination. We use the newswire service Reuters 
News to extract these statements, along with a time stamp indicating the day on which they 
occur. We are careful in focusing on forward-looking statements and in avoiding duplication 
of statements in the database. The extraction is done in a mechanical manner using a set of 
search words, including the name of the policy maker together with the words interest rates, 
monetary policy, inflation, economy or economic outlook. This classification follows the 
examples of Guthrie and Wright (2000) and Kohn and Sack (2004). 
 
As a final step, we classify the statements by the committee members into those that indicate 
an inclination towards monetary policy tightening, those that suggest an easing, and those that 
are neutral: 
 


















The classification of the statements is important and thus needs a more detailed discussion. 
The technique of extracting meaning from language is often referred to as content analysis 
(e.g. Holsti 1969). The idea of content analysis is to devise a number of rules to provide a 
clean classification and to minimize the number of false classifications. In our case, the 
statements have been double-checked by the authors and independently by the research 
analyst. In case there was a disagreement on the classification, other reports were used to 
classify the statement. A statement was discarded if no agreement could be reached. Overall, 
most statements were judged to be unanimous and only a relatively small number of 
statements was excluded from the analysis. 
 
Nevertheless, a number of additional caveats should be stressed at this point. First, the list of 
statements included in our database may not capture all statements by all committee members 
as Reuters News may be selective in its reporting. Second, statements by policy-makers may 
be misreported or be misinterpreted by the markets, and may thus trigger a reaction that is 
undesired by the policy maker. Although we recognize the potential relevance of these 
caveats, for the purpose of this study we are primarily interested in the information that 
market participants receive, and thus we are less concerned for instance by the fact that 
newswire services may decide not to report all statements. 21
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Appendix C: Quotes of statements by FOMC members reported during 
the purdah 
 
Forrestal, 07.02.94     
"Earlier declines in oil prices and ongoing import competition are keeping prices well behaved. Of 
course if growth does prove stronger than expected, we could see rising pressures on resources by the 
end of the year." 
 
LaWare, 08.02.94     
Heading the all-star lineup, Fed board governor John LaWare in Boston Tuesday said that while the 
U.S. inflation outlook at the moment was not particularly alarming, anticipation of inflation could 
trigger inflationary behavior. As for last Friday's rate hike, he said that in the past, sufficient action had 
not been taken to choke off inflationary behavior.  
"I don't think there's any reason to believe inflation will deteriorate, but it was a symbolic move to 
demonstrate the Fed's commitment to keeping inflation under control." 
LaWare said more rapid-than-expected growth in the fourth quarter and other positive economic 
indicators mean "inflationary pressures could begin to build. In a time when there is heightened 
inflationary anticipation, it can trigger actual inflationary behavior." 
 
Broaddus, 16.03.94      
"Most recently, we've had at least some anecdotal comments that suggest that in fact some price 
increases (at the supplier level) ... are beginning to move," Broaddus said.  
"I think it's important that we conduct policy in a way that does err on the side of caution," Broaddus 
said. 
 
McDonough, 19.03.94     
"We cannot afford to risk a surge in inflation," William McDonough said in a speech prepared for a 
Dallas Federal Reserve conference. 
"Clearly, the Federal Reserve needs to provide sufficient liquidity to prevent budget stringency from 
holding down the economy," McDonough said.  
At the same time, the Fed must not permit an acceleration in the rate of inflation, he said.  
"Achieving that balance will certainly be one of the Federal Reserve's greatest challenges during the 
remainder of this decade."  
 
Phillips, 15.04.94  
"I do think that recent data on inflation have been fairly good," Phillips said. 
As for the U.S. inflation outlook, Phillips said, "There is a positive environment for keeping inflation 
controlled." 
She cited slack in international product markets, U.S. producers' commitments to control costs and U.S. 
productivity growth as factors behind keeping labor costs and consumer prices down. "These are good 
reasons to be optimistic." 
 
Greenspan, 22.09.94     
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan said Thursday the U.S. economy has slowed from its 
"exuberant" levels in late 1993 and early this year, but that growth remains solid. 
"The (U.S.) economy is doing well, no question about it. It is solid and its underlying growth is fairly 
solid," Greenspan told the panel. 
 
Forrestal, 25.01.95     
"The principal issue we need to deal with is whether or not the economy is less inflation-prone than it 
was in the recent past," Robert Forrestal, President of the Atlanta Federal Reserve Bank, said.  
If indeed it is, Forrestal suggested in a speech on Monday, the Fed would not have to raise interest rates 
as aggressively as in the past to keep price pressures in check. 
 
Greenspan, 25.01.95     
"We would welcome the possibility that our economic performance can be in excess of historical 
relationships," Greenspan said. "But if we ignore experience, we would be taking unacceptable risks of 
higher inflation (and) economic and financial instability." 
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Greenspan, 27.01.95      
"The very torrid rate of growth that we had through the latter part of 1994 is slowing down, and that is 
an important plus for the economy," he told the Senate Budget Committee. 
 
Minehan, 30.03.95     
"Retail sales have slowed in recent months and the national pace of job growth has moderated. Some 
interest-sensitive sectors of the economy are also slowing -- auto production has slipped in past months 
and activity in the nation's housing sector is more subdued," Minehan added. 
 
Blinder, 18.05.95 
The vice chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve said on Thursday he was optimistic the central bank 
would reduce growth to a sustainable rate without tipping the economy into recession. 
Although inflationary pressures are mounting, he said he did not think inflation "has got a lot of 
momentum" and believes the natural rate of unemployment -- the rate consistent with stable inflation -- 
is about 5.5 to 5.6 percent. 
 
McDonough, 18.05.95 
Looking forward, he said monetary policy will depend on what the Fed sees happening in the future, 
adding: "One of the main features of the future is the decline of the savings rate in American 
households since the mid-1980's." 
"The rest of the world, those very savers on whom our already inadequate investment depends, are 
losing patience with a country that they increasingly think is not managing its domestic economy 
sufficiently well," McDonough said. 
 
Greenspan, 22.09.95   
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan said Friday the economy was looking up and that he saw no 
signs that growth was being held back by the high level of short-term interest rates. 
"On the whole, the near-term prospects for the U.S. economy have improved in recent months," 
Greenspan told the Senate Banking Committee. 
"Real short-term interest rates are marginally above where the intermediate average has been," 
Greenspan said. "(But) we have general indications that the economy is nonetheless moving forward." 
"The inflation picture is (also) looking more favourable," the Fed chief said. "Inflation ... has moved 




"We are not satisfied with 2.5 to 3.0 percent inflation," McTeer told a Rotary Club and Better Business 
Bureau meeting. "We ought to keep edging inflation downward until it goes it away." 
McTeer added that the Dallas Fed's own estimate is of an upward bias of 0.5 percent to 1.0 percent, 
which would bring the current inflation rate down to around 1.0 percent. But he stressed that the goal is 
to push inflation even lower to the point where it is completely eradicated. 
"Five percent short-term interest rates do not seem all that burdensome to me. I think if the economy 
has an impulse to grow, it will grow." 
McTeer described the current unemployment rate of 5.5 percent as "fairly low." 
Concerning recent figures on industrial production and capacity utilization, McTeer said they were 
"strong but not overly strong." 
 
Greenspan, 27.03.96     
"Recent economic data suggest that the economy should be able to continue operating at a high level ..., 
sustaining growth without risking a reversal of progress that has been made toward ... price stability," 
he said. 
 
McTeer, 15.08.96     
The U.S. economy is "without noticeable stress or strains," he said in a speech delivered at the Buenos 
Aires stock exchange. 






Working Paper Series No 868
February 2008
Broaddus, 07.11.96   
"The recent inflation reports have...been encouraging," Broaddus said in a speech at the University of 
North Carolina at Pembroke. 
Broaddus highlighted the fact that the core CPI is up 2.7 percent over the last year, which he said was 
"a quite moderate rate of growth." 
Broaddus said the current inflation rate of around three percent was "not good enough." He suggested 
pushing the rate down toward two percent and "holding it there for the long haul." 
Turning to recent trends in economic growth, Broaddus noted that gross domestic product growth 
decelerated sharply in the third quarter to an annual rate of 2.2 percent after "hefty" growth of 4.7 
percent in the second quarter.  
However, he said: "My own view is that this is a happy outcome because it tends to support the current 
predictions of the majority of economic forecasters that the economy is slowing to a more sustainable 
growth rate." 
 
Greenspan, 20.03.97     
"Activity has retained a great deal of vigour in early 1997," the central bank chief said. "The prospects 
for sustaining the expansion are quite favourable." 
 
Broaddus, 13.05.97     
"Well, the forecast is for a modest increase in the core rate of inflation this year, but really only a 
modest, marginal increase, with the core CPI remaining below 3.0 percent at an annual rate in 1997," 
he added. 
"There are some downside risks, but ladies and gentleman, as I look at all of the factors as best as I can 
I would have to say I think the risk ... is more heavily weighted to the upside, specially with respect 
with prospects of prices and inflation," Broaddus said. 
 
McDonough, 23.09.97   
"The August data indicates that the situation as we saw it before of continuing economic growth and 




"The recent data continue to show that prices are rising at a rather subdued pace." 
"I do think that the risks to the inflation outlook seem to be tilted to the upside," she said. "The bottom 
line for me at least is we can't let our guard down and declare victory in the battle against inflation." 
 
Rivlin, 07.11.97     
"From an aggregate point of view, almost all the economic news is good, astonishingly so." 
Inflation was "remarkably low," to the surprise of economists, she said. 
 
Guynn, 05.11.97     
"My Fed colleagues and I must be ready, again, to adjust monetary policy promptly if and when is 
called for," Guynn stated. 
 
Greenspan, 07.11.97     
"Biases of a few tenths in annual inflation rates do not matter when inflation is high. They do matter 
when, as now, a debate has emerged over whether our economies are moving toward price deflation." 
 
McDonough, 13.11.97   
"The U.S. economy is doing extraordinarily well," McDonough told an audience of economists and 
businesspeople gathered here.  
McDonough said U.S. inflation has been very well contained and in some cases even falling. 
 
Greenspan, 13.11.97     
"The forces that have emerged out of the Southeast Asian difficulties are imparting a disinflationary 
aspect on the United States and others. I am not saying that they are dominant or overwhelming ... they 
are a force but they are not at this stage the severe dominant force in this country." 
"To date, the direct impact of these developments on the American economy has been modest, but it 
can be expected not to be negligible." 
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Rivlin, 09.12.97     
"We haven't had inflation, the only reason for worrying about inflation is that the economy might 
overheat, and we see this (the crisis in Asia) taking the pressure off somewhat." 
 
McDonough, 10.12.97 
"The Federal Reserve has not had a single measure, as say the Bundesbank, for quite a long time. So, 
when you have an international disturbance of the kind we have had since July, one looks at what is the 
effect on the macroeconomy," he said.  
"If the macroeconomy would be weaker than the alternate, that certainly would indicate a consideration 
for monetary policy, and I think that would be the single most important effect on one's thinking," 
 
Minehan, 26.03.98      
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston President Cathy Minehan said on Thursday the U.S. banking system is 
healthier than ever due to a sound U.S. economy with low inflation and strict fiscal discipline. 
 
Phillips, 26.03.98    
"The Asian situation is still unfolding, so we don't have any clear picture yet but there undoubtedly will 
be some effect." 
"We are starting to see some effects but I think it will be more visible in the second quarter," and will 
likely "be anywhere from 1/2 percent to one percent." 
 
McTeer, 27.03.98     
"I don't see how it (the Asian crisis) can be anything but a negative factor in the long run." 
As for the economy in general, McTeer concluded his remarks by saying the U.S. was "doing great," 
noting significant progress in the technology arena. 
 
Rivlin, 21.05.98     
"The economy at the moment is going very well. But there is always the danger of overheating, of 
generating inflationary pressure that would be hard to turn around." 
 
McDonough, 26.06.98   
"Now in the eighth year of uninterrupted growth, key economic data show few signs of the pressures 
that could end the expansion any time soon." 
"In my view we are in a period of price stability right now." 
 
Guynn, 22.09.98     
Guynn, who had told the Money Marketeers all interest rate options seemed open at the moment, 
described the risks to the U.S. economy as essentially balanced now. 
 
McDonough, 22.09.98 
McDonough said while official data still showed strong growth except for in exports - which were hurt 
by Asia's economic troubles - there were plenty of signs pointing otherwise.  
"The anecdotal evidence regarding investment plans, regarding reductions in the labour force and the 
beginnings of a reduction in consumer confidence all add up," he said. "The balance of risk has shifted 
from one of concern about inflation to one of concern about inadequate growth." 
 
Moskow, 22.09.98     
"Just a few months ago, it seemed that the risks of inflationary pressures generated by our domestic 
economy outweighed the risks presented by developments overseas." 
"More recently, however, these risks seem to have moved into closer balance even as the level of 
uncertainty increased." 
"On the one hand, the fundamentals remain strong in our domestic economy." 
"We continue to see tight labour markets and there's still a very real risk of inflationary pressures 
emerging." 
Moskow stressed the other side of the U.S. economic dichotomy comes from "the volatility in the stock 
market (that) may trim the growth in consumer and business spending to some degree." 
"The Asia situation and problems in other parts of the world have reduced foreign demand for our 
goods and services. This has offset some of the potential inflationary consequences from tight labour 
markets and strong domestic demand." 
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Broaddus, 23.09.98     
"The current risk of deflation is relatively low, as is the risk of inflation." 
 
McDonough, 25.09.98   
The country had had a "remarkably good performance on inflation and I would anticipate that will 
continue to be the case." 
 
Parry, 09.10.98     
Parry said he expects annual U.S. GDP growth to slow to below 2.0 percent in 1999, but that he was 
not expecting a recession.  
Parry said he did not think the U.S. economy was "particularly likely" to experience deflation, although 
he said there were some areas of the economy, such as commodities, that were experiencing a period of 
declining prices. 
 
McDonough, 14.10.98   
"Signals of a possible credit crunch are in capital markets, specifically in fixed-income markets." 
"I don't see anything on the horizon now that leads me to believe any unusual activity by the lender of 
last resort (the Federal Reserve) is near or anywhere near." 
McDonough also described the U.S. deflation risk as "very low" and the inflation threat as "lower than 
it was six months ago." 
 
Moskow, 15.10.98     
"I should stress that we haven't seen many signs of actual weakness in our domestic economy." 
 
McTeer, 19.11.98     
"We still have very tight labour markets, with upward pressure on wages and other employment costs, 
and the money supply is growing well above historically safe rates. At the same time, worldwide 
deflationary pressures have intensified with the Asian and Russian crises." 
"Money growth has been rapid recently, but an acceleration of inflation seems unlikely to me in the 
face of continuing worldwide deflationary pressures. Oil and other commodities, as well as gold and 
other metals, continue to decline at rapid rates." 
 
McDonough, 16.12.98   
"The likelihood of U.S. inflation is not severe." 
 
McDonough, 27.01.99 
"The consensus forecast is about 2.5 percent (of GDP growth) and I think as we enter 1999 as strong as 
we (were) in the last quarter of last year - which was very powerful - I think most people will be 
inching up their forecasts. 
 
Parry, 23.03.99     
"Overall, we're expecting a modest slowdown from the very rapid rates (of GDP growth) of last year - 
in the range of 2.5 to 3.0 percent - with continued low inflation.” 
 
Minehan, 24.03.99     
"There is no doubt that this investment in technology has something to do with the U.S. economy's 
strong productivity growth. 
"This level of growth has to be playing some role in the U.S. economy's low inflation rate in the face of 
very tight labour markets. 
 
Boehne, 26.03.99    
"The performance of the banking industry, like that of the overall economy, has been quite remarkable 
for some time. 
 
Moskow, 11.05.99     
"Overall, the risks of slower growth versus inflationary pressures are reasonably balanced at present. 
 
Rivlin, 13.05.99     
"There are things to balance here - the rapid growth of the economy might give us inflation, although it 
hasn't yet, and downside possibilities, which mostly come from the weak world economy." 26
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McDonough, 19.05.99   
One day after the Fed said it may have to raise interest rates to fend off inflationary pressures, 
McDonough told a housing conference that productivity gains have made it "possible for the economy 
to grow rapidly. We have higher wages and we do not have inflation." 
 
McDonough, 23.06.99   
"At this point, the issue is the potential for inflation which, if allowed to break out, is destructive to the 
economy." 
 
Guynn, 20.08.99     
he warned the Community Bankers of Georgia gathered in Colorado Springs that today's red-hot 
economy may be producing "unrealistic expectations". 
 
McDonough, 01.10.99   
"As of this moment, it would appear that you can grow the American economy at essentially 4 percent 
per year and have that growth be sustainable." 
 
Stern, 11.11.99     
"Wage increases can be offset by productivity increases, and in that case inflation stays low." 
 
McTeer, 18.11.99      
McTeer said he thought the core U.S. inflation rate recorded in October, a rise of 0.2 percent, was a 
good number. 
"I don't consider it a goal of the Fed to dampen down asset prices." 
 
Minehan, 14.12.99     
"Even if one assumes that all the growth in average productivity since 1996 is structural, given the 
current very high rates of labour utilization, there is a case to be made that the economy has been 
growing beyond what is sustainable." 
"In this environment, continuing to operate beyond potential carries increasing inflation risk, and risk 
that this long, benevolent period of U.S. economic growth will come to an end." 
 
Greenspan, 26.01.00     
Answering questions, Greenspan reiterated a long-standing warning that the booming U.S. economy 
was running out of available workers, going as far as to suggest that the country's immigration laws 
should be relaxed. 
But he also noted that the rate of productivity growth, which has helped to temper inflation, had not yet 
shown any signs of slowing.  
"There is really no evidence at this stage that the acceleration process has as yet shown early signs of 
cresting," he said. 
 
Greenspan, 22.03.00      
"Not only has the expansion achieved record length, but it has done so with far stronger growth than 
expected." 
"A key factor behind this impressive performance has been the remarkable acceleration in labour 
productivity." 
 
Parry, 09.05.00     
"The Fed is interested in getting the growth rate of the entire economy down to a more sustainable 
rate." 
 
Ferguson, 09.05.00     
"I firmly believe that we should recognise that, even in a high-productivity economy, stresses and 
imbalances might emerge." 
"The wedge between demand and supply growth cannot continue indefinitely because, once pressures 
on limited resources rise sufficiently, inflation will start to pick up." 
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Ferguson, 12.05.00     
"The U.S. experience of the last several years has also taught us that low and stable inflation is the 
underpinning for sustainable growth and that sustainable growth fosters the maximum creation of jobs 
over time." 
 
McDonough, 18.05.00   
"Even with the ability to produce goods and services at say 4 to 4.5 percent, the demand side of the 
economy is much stronger." 
 
McTeer, 05.10.00     
"We haven't repealed the laws of supply and demand, but we are finding some loopholes," he said. 
"Inflation is down, not out. There are still limits (to demand growth), but they're higher limits." 
 
McTeer, 10.11.00     
He noted that the U.S. central bank left short-term interest rates unchanged last month while warning of 
continued inflation risks because of rising energy costs and the nation's tight labor market. 
 
Stern, 11.05.01 
Stern, who stressed he was speaking for himself and not for the U.S. central bank as a body, called the 
U.S. economic slowdown "significant" and noted it was much deeper than forecasters had predicted. 
However, the Minneapolis Fed president said he was "optimistic" about the long-term health of the 
U.S. economy, noting that the nation's economy has proven itself to be resilient, strong productivity 
gains should continue in the future and public policy will likely continue to boost growth. 
 
Greenspan, 20.06.01   
"We see no evidence that those costs are being passed through to final prices in any material way," the 
Fed chief said in response to questions from members of the Senate Banking Committee. Nor were 
"fairly extraordinary increases" in energy costs showing up in goods prices, he said, though they were 
squeezing corporate profits. 
Greenspan said core inflation, which excludes volatile food and energy costs, was "relatively stable" 
and showed no signs of accelerating. 
 
McTeer, 23.08.01      
"The dramatic gains made in recent years by those on the fringes of the labor force are threatened. So 
far the damage has apparently not fallen disproportionately on them, but it will if we do not get the 
economy jump started soon." 
 
Santomero, 05.11.01     
"As the world economy deals with a slowing U.S. economy, a slowing Japanese economy and a 
slowing Europe, the tenuous grip on economic growth has become even more tenuous in light of the 
increasing concerns about emerging markets and the aftermath of September 11." 
 
Ferguson, 08.11.01   
"As testimony to the resilience of the American spirit, the immediate impact of the attacks has proved 
transient." 
"The longer term prospects for the U.S. economy remain sound, just as they were before Sept. 11." 
He conceded, however, that for a period of time "consumer and business behaviors will significantly 
affect the way our economy progresses." 
 
Moskow, 04.12.01     
"The strength in the housing sector this year has been very positive for the U.S. economy that is clearly 
extremely weak at this point." 
 
McDonough, 06.12.01 
"I don't know what the economy is going to do next year. What we don't know is - are we at the turn, 
have we reached the turn?" 
 
Greenspan, 24.01.02     
"But there have been signs recently that some of the forces that have been restraining the economy over 
the past year are starting to diminish and that activity is beginning to firm." 28
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McTeer, 23.01.02     
"I think the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) numbers they've got are realistic, but they may be a little 
bit too conservative." 
"I think the weakness in the first half will probably be offset by more strength in the second half." 
 
Olson, 12.03.02     
"We have recently experienced a decade of economic prosperity followed by more than a year of weak 
economic conditions. For the past few months we have seen clear indication that economic conditions 
are improving and we are either at or near the end of the down cycle." 
 
Greenspan, 14.03.02     
Greenspan repeated recent testimony he had made to Congress, citing "increasing signs that some of 
the forces restraining the economy over the past year are starting to diminish and that activity is 
beginning to firm." 
 
Santomero, 21.03.02     
"As the year progresses, we will move steadily from recession to recovery and sustained expansion." 
"It's commonly the case that inflation numbers decline at the beginning of a recovery because of the 
excess capacity associated with a recession. Therefore, in the near term, I believe inflation is well 
contained." 
 
Greenspan, 25.09.02     
While the recovery has been patchy, Greenspan said productivity, or output per worker, has been 
"unbelievably strong" in recent quarters, which implies continued growth. 
 
McTeer, 23.01.03     
"I think the outlook for 2003 is certainly not for a relapse or a double dip, maybe not for a booming 
economy but I think the stage is set reasonably well." 
"I think the conditions for continued recovery and for the recovery to gather some momentum are very 
good." 
 
McDonough, 20.03.03   
"One concern I have is that the recovery in the business sector continues to be restrained not just by 
geopolitical uncertainty and the need for further restructuring in some key sectors, but by caution on 
the part of investors and lenders." 
"The effects of the bursting of the stock market bubble have proven to be far more long-term and 
pervasive than expected." 
"The employment claims data this morning are gloomy yet again." 
He said the U.S. economy was growing below its potential growth rate. 
 
Greenspan, 30.04.03     
"I continue to believe that the economy is positioned to expand at a noticeably better pace than it has 
during the past year, though the timing and the extent of that remains uncertain." 
 
McTeer, 07.08.03     
"When I think of it by sector, like you're making me do now, it feels pretty pessimistic because it's 
pretty easy to conclude that the consumer's been carrying this thing for so long that there can't be much 
left," he was quoted as saying. "And it's going to be hard for business fixed investment to come in and 
substitute for them." 
"But if I think about it another way, and think of all the reasons that the overall economy ought to pick 
up in growth - easy money, easy fiscal policy, a huge tax cut that's just now being implemented, a 
weaker dollar, a stronger stock market - all those things make me feel pretty positive." 
 
Broaddus, 29.10.03     
In any event, he said, economic growth appeared to have accelerated to an annual pace around 5.5 
percent in the third quarter, adding: "And there are at least a few preliminary signs that the weakness in 
the job market is abating." 
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Greenspan, 12.03.04     
"As our economy exhibits increasing signals of recovery, job loss continues to diminish," the Fed chief 
said in prepared remarks for delivery to a financial conference at Boston College. "In all likelihood, 
employment will begin to increase more quickly before long as output continues to expand." 
 
Gramlich, 16.09.04     
"The worst possible outcome is for monetary policy to let inflation come loose from its moorings." 
 
Gramlich, 23.09.04 
Asked following a speech if large government borrowing needs could fuel price increases, Gramlich 
said, "It could if you don't have a credible central bank." 
 
Ferguson, 03.11.05     
"Given the persistence of high energy prices that the global economy has confronted of late, 
policymakers cannot be complacent." 
"Central bankers must reinforce their credibility and validate the confidence of market participants by 
actively leaning against inflationary pressures long before inflation itself builds." 
 
Bernanke, 21.03.06 
"Broadly speaking I think that consumer finances are consistent with continued reasonable growth in 
consumption and enough to keep the economy at or close to its potential output growth rates." 
 
Stern, 04.05.06     
"The outlook for the American economy is very, very promising, certainly for the rest of this year and 
for 2007." 
"In my opinion, core inflation will remain historically low." 
Handelsblatt said Stern did not expect that any further interest rate rises would harm the economy. 
"The US economy is not fragile, but rather very flexible and resilient," he was quoted as saying. "We 
are now in the fifth year of an expansion and for me, it looks as though it is going to continue for quite 
a while." 
 
Bies,  04.05.06     
"We've come through a period of weaker rents. Now, housing has really sort of peaked ... that may 
rejuvenate rents and so you may see that, in turn, higher (CPI) inflation going forward." 
Bies said, however, the Fed focuses more heavily on the core personal consumption expenditures price 
index than the CPI. 
 
Lacker, 22.06.07    
"While still relatively low by historical standards, I view that number -- and, more importantly, the 
upward trend in inflation -- with some caution. Inflation is, in my opinion, too high. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of 6-month interest rate changes on FOMC 
communication days, 1994-2007 
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Note: The histograms are based on the full sample period 1994-2007 as shown in Table 1. 32
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1994-2007 1994-2000 2001-2007 of which:
2005-2007
Total number of :
scheduled FOMC meetings 106 55 51 20
No purdah statements 415 139 276 140
Pre-FOMC purdah statements 46 31 15 2
Post-FOMC purdah statements 16 10 6 1
% share of FOMC meetings with purdah statements
All purdah 42.5% 52.7% 31.4% 15.0%
Pre-FOMC purdah 34.0% 43.6% 23.5% 10.0%
Post-FOMC purdah 14.2% 16.4% 11.8% 5.0%
Split sample
    
 
Note: The table shows, for the entire sample period February 1994 to June 2007, and 
various sub-periods, the number of FOMC meetings and of statements recorded 
(separately for the different inter-meeting sub-periods), as well as the share of 
FOMC meetings for which communication was recorded in the respective purdah 
periods. Note that for the % shares, numbers for “pre-FOMC purdah” and “post-
FOMC purdah” do not add up to “all purdah” as in some instances purdah statements 
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 Table 2: Effect of communication on interest rates 
 
 
coef. std.err. (1) (2) (3)
MEAN
(1) Pre-FOMC Purdah 0.043 *** 0.008 yy
(2) Post-FOMC Purdah 0.002 0.008 y
(3) No-Purdah 0.006 *** 0.001 y
VOLATILITY
(1) Pre-FOMC Purdah 0.102 ** 0.042 yy
(2) Post-FOMC Purdah -0.307 *** 0.099 yy




Note: The table shows the EGARCH estimates of the effects of statements in the pre-FOMC purdah, 
the post-FOMC purdah, and those outside the purdah period on the conditional mean and the 
conditional variance for US 6-month interest rates. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% 
and 90% levels, respectively. “y” indicates that the coefficient in a given row is significantly (at the 
90% level) different from the corresponding coefficient in the row indicated by the number in brackets 
in the table header. 
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Table 3: Effect of communication – 
Characteristics of FOMC policy decisions and market uncertainty  
 
coef. std.err. coef. std.err. sig.
MEAN
Pre-FOMC Purdah 0.036 *** 0.012 0.044 *** 0.003
Post-FOMC Purdah 0.004 0.040 0.013 0.012
No-Purdah 0.009 *** 0.002 0.008 *** 0.001
VOLATILITY
Pre-FOMC Purdah 0.181 ** 0.077 -0.042 0.085 y
Post-FOMC Purdah -0.327 *** 0.124 -0.678 *** 0.208
No-Purdah -0.022 0.019 -0.053 *** 0.011
coef. std.err. coef. std.err. sig.
MEAN
Pre-FOMC Purdah 0.081 *** 0.016 0.045 *** 0.015 y
Post-FOMC Purdah 0.009 0.013 0.506 *** 0.000 y
No-Purdah 0.010 *** 0.001 0.008 *** 0.002
VOLATILITY
Pre-FOMC Purdah 0.256 *** 0.064 -0.329 ** 0.128 y
Post-FOMC Purdah -0.419 *** 0.117 -1.129 *** 0.417 y
No-Purdah 0.003 0.010 -0.078 *** 0.026 y
coef. std.err. coef. std.err. sig.
MEAN
Pre-FOMC Purdah 0.044 *** 0.016 0.074 ** 0.032
Post-FOMC Purdah 0.012 0.013 0.003 0.041
No-Purdah 0.008 *** 0.001 0.026 *** 0.002 y
VOLATILITY
Pre-FOMC Purdah -0.254 *** 0.078 0.684 *** 0.078 y
Post-FOMC Purdah -0.576 *** 0.181 -0.461 *** 0.129
No-Purdah -0.057 *** 0.009 0.061 ** 0.030 y
NO YES
POLICY CHANGE NEXT FOMC MEETING
NO YES
INTEREST RATE VOLATILITY
POLICY SURPRISE LAST FOMC MEETING
LOW HIGH
 
Note: Distinguishing between FOMC meeting characteristics, the table shows the EGARCH estimates 
of the effects of statements in the pre-FOMC purdah, the post-FOMC purdah, and those outside the 
purdah period on the conditional mean and the conditional variance for US 3-month interest rates. An 
interest rate surprise is defined to be present whenever the unexpected component of an FOMC 
decision – measured as the mean of Reuters survey expectations – exceeds its sample mean (which is 
3.7 basis points over the whole sample period). Interest rate volatility is measured as the standard 
deviation of daily movements of 3-month rates in the inter-meeting period before the purdah. “High” 
volatility is defined for each period when this variable exceeds its sample mean over the whole period, 
and “low” when it is below. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels, 
respectively. “y” indicates that the two respective coefficients in each row are significantly different at 
the 90% level. 35
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